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The study of midterm congressional elections by contrast has been scanty, probably because the findings which have been reported comport so well with existing knowledge and theory about voting behavior.
The "Surge and Decline" Thesis Compared to presidential elections, midterm congressional contests are portrayed by the literature as rather unexciting and routine events both for the voter and for the political system. Without highly visible presidential candidates barnstorming the country and advertising national political issues, midterm congressional campaigns generate lower media coverage, lower voter attention, and consequently lower election-day turnout-usually by about 15 percentage points.3 The short-run forces of personalities and stylized issues which arouse voter interest during presidential elections are also responsible for much of the vote volatility which assures the Republican nominee a chance to overcome his initial partisan deficit. The absence of these forces during midterm elections means that voting will even more greatly rest on the voter's party identification. According to survey findings of the mid and late 1 950s, defections from party represent only about 10 per cent of the votes cast, and independents make up a smaller proportion of the midterm electorate.4 Thus, while each presidential campaign will be marked by its unique configuration of competing personalities and issues, and often high levels of defection at the polls, a midterm congressional election is characterized by lower interest, reduced turnout, and party voting.
This scenario of midterm voting portends several political consequences. First, it means that as long as Democrats remain the majority party, they should win most of the congressional seats during midterm contests. Indeed, only once since the New Deal realignments have the Republicans managed to win control of Congress during a midterm election. More importantly, low voter interest and party voting mean that major gains in congressional seats produced by the coattail of the victorious presidential candidate will be short-lived. Every four years since 1938 marginal voters who were stimulated by the winning candidate fail to show up at the polls, and defectors, who apparently went disproportionately to the winner, return home. As a result, the President's party loses congressional seats; the magnitude of these losses directly reflects the magnitude of the gains produced by the winner's coattails.5 Thus, midterm congressional elections serve to restore party competition and equity by repairing the damage done to the losing party by the presidential election two years earlier.
Two Problems With Surge and Decline. At first glance "surge and decline" presents us with a tight structure underpinned by the foundations of modern voting theory. The voter's marginal interest in politics, the dominant role of party identification in electoral decisions, and the sources of stimulation for both voting participation and defection serve as basic ingredients of the surge and decline thesis. Employing these features, surge and decline pulls off the neat trick of explaining the apparent anomaly that every two years there is a substantial, nationwide shift in the electorate's political preferences. Low stimulation and disinterest-not highly motivated policy voting-account for the systematic alternation of success and failure at the polls.
Despite this virtue, two distinct issues lead one to question the adequacy of surge and decline in explaining midterm voting. The first criticizes its failure to predict and explain-or even to address-important electoral outcomes. This criticism argues that surge and decline is incomplete; its sins are those of omission. The second issue is potentially even more destructive; rather than being merely incomplete, the surge and decline conclusions based on the 1958 election are inaccurate when applied to other midterm elections.
The few midterm defections which do occur are conventionally viewed as reflecting peculiar features of the local campaign or individual voter qualities, rather than as representing a widespread effort to reward or punish a given political party. Two frequently cited sources of defection are "friends-and-neighbors" voting and name familiarity of the candidate.6 For the purpose of identifying or explaining a national electoral movement during the midterm election away from one party and toward another, neither variable is very helpful. Although these variables may be important for explaining variance among individual voters and thereby informing us that in many instances voter defection is politically idiosyncratic, they are silent about the systematic influences which may be politically decisive in determining party control of the national legislature. The preoccupation of the existing research with the politically more sterile aspects of defections can be seen from the following passages both of which draw their conclusions from the 1958 SRC survey. Donald Stokes and Warren Miller acknowledge as an afterthought: ". . . there is some variation, and these moderate swings must be attributed to forces that have their focus at the national level....
Our main point is rather that ... the proportion of deviating votes that can be attributed to national politics is likely to be a small part of the total votes cast by persons deviating from party in a mid-term year."7 In his important article, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," Angus Campbell reveals his focus with the following understatement: ". . . the partisan movement in 1958 decline toward standing party loyalties after the displacement of the vote in a surge year."8 The genuinely curious thing about these conclusions is that they are based on the election which produced the largest midterm landslide since the 1920s. More than 56 per cent of the total vote went to the Democratic party and, as a result, the Democrats picked up 48 congressional seats from Republicans who had not benefited greatly from President Eisenhower's victory two years earlier. If ever there were an ideal election for discerning what V. 0. Key described as a "national party battle," the 1958 election was it.9 Yet most conclusions founded on the 1958 election fail to recognize this.
The second problem is whether the thesis is descriptively accurate. Examining surge and decline for the last three midterm elections, Arseneau and Wolfinger have discovered some important departures from the 1958 electionbased conclusions.10 The critical evidence for the partisan implications of the midterm "decline" should be a disproportionately large withdrawal from participation by independents and a significant reduction in partisan defections. In Table 1 we can see that both the independent dropout rate and the level of party-line voting were higher in 1958 than for the other midterm elections. In fact, comparing the partisan composition of the midterm electorates with the presidential electorates yields little evidence to verify the surge and decline phenomenon. In two of the four midterm 8Campbell, Surge and Decline .., pp. 55-57; a similar theme is also given in his "Voters and Elections: Past and Present" in Journal of Politics, 26 (November, 1964), 745-757. For both Campbell and Hinckley (whose measurement is the loss and gain of seats) the systematic partisan shift becomes the residual difference between the predicted normal vote (a seat loss) and the actual results. Defining the error term as the partisan shift prevents us from testing the accuracy of surge and decline and ignores the causes of a national partisan movement. by the large, overall reductions in turnout-fails to produce a disproportionate reduction in participation among the generally more marginal independent voters. The absence of presidential candidates in the campaign and on the ballot for some reason fails to reduce the level of partisan defection. In turn the systematic decline of the victorious party in the presidential election two years earlier can no longer rest solely on differential turnout and party voting. With surge and decline in disrepair as presently formulated, we again find ourselves trying to account for the highly regular midterm shift in party fortunes.
A Different View of Midterm Elections
Presidents dreading the prospects of a less friendly Congress, and congressmen sensing that their political careers may be subject to the vagaries of short-run national forces, adopt a "tIbid.,p. 17. 1956  1958  1960  1962  1964  1966  1968  1970   Party-line votes  82  84  80  83  79  76  74  76  Defection  9  11  12  12  15  16  19  16  Independentsb  9  5  8  6  5  8  7  8  100%  100%  100%  101%  99%  100%  100%  100% aFrom press and reviewing biographical accounts of the participants over the last 25 years, one is impressed by the general continuity of the assumptions and beliefs that careful observers and participants have employed to predict and explain elections. Long before behavioral political science had identified and specified the effects of presidential coattails, politicians already had developed through experience a rather accurate conventional wisdom about which party's congressional candidates benefited during the presidential victory, which suffered two years later, and why. Another equally pervasive theme has, however, received no systematic inspectionmuch less verification; this is that the President's public standing is a major component of those national shifts of public opinion which shape voting during midterm elections. Before testing this belief empirically, perhaps it will prove useful to describe briefly its effects on politicians' behavior and campaign strategies.
The unprecedented "in" party midterm victory of 1934 was widely hailed as an affirmation of the public's enchantment with Franklin Roosevelt; according to his biographers, the President agreed with this interpretation pri- 23The author is currently investigating the degree to which career decisions of politicians are based on the President's public standing. Entry onto a number of rungs in the career ladder may be affected. The number of candidates seeking each party's congressional nomination, the percentage of congressmen from each party trying to become a senator or governor, and the percentage who decide to retire from the House are currently being examined. If presidential popularity is an important consideration in career movement we should find an inverse correlation between the Democratic and Republican percentages on the above measures. If a low presidential popularity is found to discourage viable candidates from the President's party from attempting to get on or move up the office ladder, while at the same time encouraging candidacies from the opposition, the overall congressional vote could, in part, reflect systematic party differences in the quality of the candidacies. Why would a party be more successful in opposition than in control of the presidency? Intuitively, one might think that just the opposite would be the case. A popular president can provide valuable assets to his party's congressional candidates, including visibility from a public endorsement and a timely visit to the congressman's district. Yet even during periods when relatively popular incumbents hold office-periods such as 1954, 1962, and 1970-the President's party has still failed to achieve the same level of electoral success attained when it was the "out" party. A frequently mentioned but never fully elaborated theme in political science literature which may provide a clue is that the electorate votes against policies and incumbents to a greater degree than it votes for new policies and candidates. The American Voter closes with an important discussion of party equilibrium in which negative voting is an integral ingredient:
... the party division of the vote is most likely to be changed by a negative public reaction to the record of the party in power.... A majority party, once it is in office, will not continue to accrue electoral strength; it may preserve for a time its electoral majority, but the next marked change in the party vote will issue from a negative response of the electorate to some aspect of the party's conduct in office, a response that tends to return the minority party to power.25 Recent research in social psychology largely complements the view that negative opinions exercise disproportionate influence in political behavior. Studies utilizing a variety of experimental settings have consistently shown that the perceived negative aspects of a stimulus 25They continue, "The crux of our theory is that changes in the party balance are induced primarily by negative rather than positive attitudes toward the party controlling the executive branch of federal government" (The American Voter, p. 554).
The American Political Science Review Vol. 71 object are more determinative of the overall evaluation of the object than its positive aspects.26 When this asymmetry of evaluations is applied to voting behavior, the proposition that negative stimuli are more instrumental to the vote choice than positive would appear to be reflected in two ways. First, failures of incumbents are more important than their achievements, and despite a long list of accomplishments, a conspicuous failure may threaten re-election.27
Second, the greater strength of negative.evaluations suggests that voters upset with an incumbent's performance will be more activated to vote against the individual than are satisfied voters likely to support him. Thus, even a popular president is not immune from negative voting; he still must work to overcome the disproportionately greater turnout and defection among those voters who are displeased for one reason or another with his performance.28
Tailoring this thesis to the question of the influence of presidential popularity on congressional voting, a negative voting model hypothesizes that citizens displeased with a president's performance are more likely to vote against his Second, the negative voter model sustains another popular belief that presidential efforts to influence the midterm congressional vote generally do more harm than good. Despite this long-standing dictum and little historical evidence to the contrary, recent presidents have done more midterm campaigning than their predecessors.3 When the President increases the public association between himself and a congressional candidate, he unwittingly facilitates the transference of negative affect as well as positive.32 This is undoubtedly why the more perspicacious party leaders asked President Truman to stay at home during the 1946 campaigns. To the degree that negative evaluations are more determinative than positive ones, even a popular president may prove to be a net liability to his party's congressional candidates. Negative voting offers a more plausible alternative explanation to the usual surmise that presidents are not successful because voters dislike presidential meddling in local affairs.
Third, the negative voting model offers an important alteration of the surge and decline thesis. in Table 1 we saw that the composition of midterm electorates with respect to party defections and the proportion of independent voters is similar to that of presidential electorates. Although each midterm election has remained consistent with the pattern of lower overall turnout, it appears that the reduction in turnout is not so uneven as to affect greatly the partisan complexion of the electorate. Since the negative voting model posits the evaluation of the President as a pivotal motivational cue, we may find that there will be in fact differential withdrawal from the electorate but that it will not necessarily show up in the turnout levels among the categories of voters identified by the surge and decline thesis-party voters, defec- First, it posits an association between presidential popularity and midterm voting, and second, it argues that the effects of presidential approval and disapproval are unequal, with negative opinion being more determinative of voting behavior. These two aspects of negative voting point to two alternative models which must be shown to be less adequate explanations of the findings. First, separates the consistency voting predictions from those of negative voting. The predictions for both models, and for the null hypothesis are delineated in Table 2 .
The crucial predictions for the null hypothesis concern turnout and defection, predictions I and II respectively. Approvers and disapprovers should resemble each other both in their levels of voting participation and their degree of party voting; the predictions for III and IV are derivative of the first two. The turnout prediction of the consistency model that "a>b" (i.e., approvers from the President's party are more participant than disapprovers) borrows from cross-pressure research which has found withdrawal from conflictual settings a common method of tension reduction. It is this prediction that most differentiates the consistency and negative voting models. Negative voting predicts the opposite ranking, with disapprovers within the president's party more likely to vote than his party's approvers (i.e., "a<b").l Moreover, the negative voting model predicts that independents who disapprove of the President vote at a higher rate than independents who approve, that is, "e<f."
The same theme governs predictions II and IV (partisan defection and independent attraction-repulsion) where the basic difference between the consistency model and negative voting is the hypothesis that negative evaluations will be more determinative of the vote choice. Prediction III also incorporates basically the same idea: if negative evaluations of the president are more important, they should reinforce party loyalties to a greater degree than positive evaluations. With these predictions we have a succinct and convenient method of exploring the data and providing a thorough assessment of negative voting against simpler and more conventional expectations.
The primary data set consists of six national surveys taken immediately after each midterm election job performance, voting participation in the midterm election, voting preference, and party identification. Although A.I.P.O. has altered its sampling procedure somewhat over the two decades covered in this study, the data remain satisfactorily comparable. 35 The predictions given in Table 2 reflect only the motivational aspects of behavior, under the assumption that the opportunities for their expression-such as defecting to the other party's candidate-are available. During the twenty year period included in this study, however, such an assumption would be clearly inappropriate. In many congressional districts, especially in the South, there was a total absence of meaningful two-party competition. By focusing on the non-southern states we achieve a better sample for exploring the motivational impact of presidential popularity on voting behavior.36 One of the percentage point differences is large and negative, two are large and positive, and two are very small, perhaps in all reflecting the simultaneous operation of both the consistency and negative voting processes which pull in opposite directions. Among the southern electorate (not shown) the differences in turnout are uniformly in the direction predicted by negative voting.37
Those who identify with the party out of the White House yield relationships that are much clearer. Given the reinforcing character of 37Within the South, the percentage point differences were -18 points for 1966. For 1954 and 1958 there were too few southern Republicans who disapproved to permit computation of percentages. Note that the higher turnout among disapprovers in both regions was particularly strong during the last two midterm elections for which there is evidence. If this indicates a forming trend, it may reflect another the consistency and negative voting processes for these voters, it is not surprising to find disapprovers substantially more likely to vote. Of the 6 percentage-point comparisons, only one deviation occurred and that was in 1958, ironically the midterm election which has probably received more attention than all of the others combined. (For the southern electorate the percentage point differences were uniformly in the predicted direction and larger.) Although the turnout for these voters over the years does not help us in deciding between the consistency and negative voting models, it does argue persuasively against accepting the null hypothesis.
Among independents, for whom only the negative voting model predicts differential rates of turnout, we find that those citizens who disapprove the President's job performance uniformly showed up at the polls in higher percentages.38 Earlier we reviewed the surge 38Independents in the present paper include respondents who when questioned further acknowledged leaning toward one of the two parties. Thus some of the "effects" of presidential popularity reported are open to the suspicion of partial spuriousness from concealed partisanship. Therefore, the analysis was replicated where possible using this purer group of independents; except for added random variation due to the reduced sample size, the same conclusions hold. Including leaners among identifiers and decline thesis which argues that the midterm resurgence of the loser two years earlier can be largely explained by the withdrawal of marginal voters-disproportionately numbered among independents-from the midterm electorate. The present findings suggest that the independents' decline in participation may not occur at an equal pace among the Presidents' admirers and detractors, however. The contented, so the negative voting model argues, have less incentive to vote. Table 4 Table 4 to increase the sample size. The reported presidential vote for 1964 was unavailable, and therefore, the 1966 data had to be excluded. Of course, evidence based on recall two years earlier must be looked upon with circumspection. In this instance a systematic recall bias-as compared to fading memory which distributes randomly-does not appear to be a problem.
To summarize, with a few noted exceptions, midterm electorates over the years have been marked by somewhat greater turnout among those citizens who disapprove of the President's job performance.
The negative voting model clearly attributes this difference to the motivational impact of disapproval. One may plausibly argue, however, that the association between disapproval and turnout is produced by greater political involvement among some segments of the electorate. Many of the social and psychological antecedents of high participation may also lead the individual to assume a more critical, less deferential posture toward political leaders. To discover that the correlation between presidential evaluation and turnout is in this manner spurious, would in fact substitute an equally important explanation for midterm voting. A discussion of this explanation and the evidence testing it are presented in an appendix. Although limitations of the data make it impossible to determine conclusively which causal process produces this relationship, the available evidence (described in the appendix) falls heavily in favor of a direct one advanced by the negative voting model.
Discovering that citizens who disapprove of the President are somewhat more likely to vote in the midterm congressional elections tells us only part of the story. The crucial question remains, do many citizens make their congressional vote choice on the basis of their evaluation of the President's performance? Without the additional influence of presidential popularity on actual voting decisions the significance of the relationship for turnout described above would be trivial.
Predictions II and III: Presidential Popularity and Partisan Voting. Although partisan defections constitute only a small portion of the total midterm vote (see Table 1 ), they may be very important for explaining marginal variations in each party's share. Defection suggests attitude conflict; evaluations of competing candidates are based on criteria which are in conflict with, and more important than, party identification.
In investigating the contribution of presidential popularity to national fluctuations of party successes, close attention should be given to the relatively small but important volatility of this vote.
In Table 2 the competing predictions concerning partisan defections for each of the three models are delineated. Briefly, the null hypothesis predicts that there should be no systematic differences in defection rates between the President's approvers and his disapprovers. The consistency model predicts that persons whose evaluation of the President is incongruent with The American Political Science Review Vol. 71 their own party identification should defect in larger proportions than voters whose presidential evaluation is consistent with party identification.
The negative voting model includes this prediction and goes further to suggest that presidential disapproval, when in conflict with party identification, will produce greater strain toward defection than will approval in a similar context. Consequently, in any given midterm election, the rates of defection among identifiers of the President's party who disapprove of their incumbent should be higher than among identifiers of the other party who approve of his job performance, or according to the schema given in Table 2 , "b>c." Similarly, disapproval should more strongly reinforce existing party affiliation when congruent. Here again, members of the "out" party should be more inclined to vote the party line (or a<d in Prediction III) according to negative voting. If these hypotheses are verified, we shall have gone some distance in explaining why the political parties seem to perform more poorly in midterm elections when they occupy the White House.
In Table 5 we find that respondents whose evaluations of the President are consistent with party identification uniformly display higher levels of party voting. The percentage point differences are not great, but they do reflect a stable if small relationship between presidential popularity and congressional voting preferences. Moreover, in each instance defections are greater for members of the President's party.
The greater influence of disapproval in producing defections (and preventing them) can also be seen by comparing instances of attitude conflict (Prediction II) and reinforcement (Prediction III) across partisan groups. In every midterm election the level of partisan defection has been higher among disapprovers within the President's party (category b of Table 2 ) than among his approvers within the other party (category c). These differences in defection can be seen in the first row of Table 6 . The prediction of negative voting, and not the consistency model, is borne out. Disapproval of the President is more influential than approval in producing defections when in conflict with party identification.40
As to the reinforcement prediction (III), again the negative voting thesis is confirmed. Disapprovers within the other party (category d) in row 2 of Table 5 40At this point some bemused readers may be entertaining the idea that "approval" and "disapproval" do not measure sentiments of equal intensity. Perhaps disapproval represents an extreme response volunteered only when the respondent feels strongly on the issue. After all, when a new president enters office without a track record a large majority of the public prefer to approve his job performance rather than withhold judgment. If approval frequently substitutes for no opinion then it is not too surprising to find it relatively uninfluential in guiding voting choices. Two pieces of evidence challenge this argument: First, from all of the available surveys, when respondents were asked their opinion on a ten-point "strongly like" to "strongly dislike" scale, a majority who disapproved of the President's job performance, nonetheless, placed themselves on the liking end of the scale. This suggests that disapproval should not be viewed as registering extreme negative evaluation. Second, Richard Boyd, using a refined five-point job performance index from the 1968 SRC survey, finds a very similar relationship, with the benefits accruing from strong approval ("very good") not nearly so great as the harm caused by strong disapproval ("very poor").
Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy . . . ," Figure 9 , p. 440. aPercentage point differences between identified categories. Positive differences are in the predicted direction.
To summarize, negative voting operates to reduce the presidential party's share of the congressional vote through party defections in two ways. First, in cases of attitude conflict between the evaluation of the President and one's party identification, disapproval produces more defections than does approval. Second, in situations of congruence between these attitudes, disapproval reinforces party line voting (within the opposition party) more strongly than approval (within the President's party). Approvers remain more susceptible to counter influences. In sum, because of negative voting the President's party is more vulnerable to midterm partisan defection.
Other things being equal, exit from the President's party at the midterm should exceed movement toward it. But other things being rarely equal, a number of variables may obscure the independent effects of negative voting. Primary among them is the unequal size of the political parties which has fluctuated from virtually even in 1946 to a 3:2 ratio in favor of the Democrats by 1966. Consequently, defections consistently came more frequently from the Democratic party (see Table 7 , row 1). Even in 1954 and 1958 with a Republican in the White House, Democratic defections at least equaled those of the President's party. In row 2, however, the effect of unequal size has been eliminated and percentages more closely reflecting the effect of negative voting can better be appreciated. Adjusted for party size, the expected pattern emerges clearly with the President's party now containing a significantly larger share of party defections in each election.
Prediction IV: Presidential Popularity and Midterm Preferences of Independents. Independent voters represent a rather sizable percentage of the midterm electorate (approximately 20 per cent, including leaners). Moreover, without strong attachments to one of the political parties, independents should be more susceptible to the influence of other political forces such as presidential popularity. Given these features, they may represent a key group of voters for explaining systematic but marginal variations in the overall congressional votevariations which parallel fluctuations in presidential popularity.
The null hypothesis, which has been thoroughly rejected thus far, predicts that the President's approvers and disapprovers divide the congressional vote between the two parties equally. The consistency model makes much the same prediction but for a different reason. Rather than having no effects, approval and disapproval are viewed as influencing independents similarly. Because the relative strengths of the two evaluations are assumed to be equal, the model predicts that approvers will vote for the President's party at the same rate as disapprovers vote against it-that is, for Prediction IV of Table 2 , "e = f." Negative voting predicated on the thesis of the differential influence of negative evaluations predicts a different outcome. Disapprovers should vote against the President's party to a greater degree than approvers will vote for it, or "e < f."
From Figure 3 we can see that, to a substantial degree, disapproval of the incumbent administration will be reflected in a 
Summary of Individual-Level Findings
The preceding analysis has uncovered the following:
(1) With the exception of members of the President's party for whom the evidence is inconclusive, disapproval of the President's job performance is associated with higher midterm turnout.
(2) When the party identification of thy respondent is controlled, presidential popularity is found to correlate with congressional preferences.
(3) Disapproval of the President is a stronger source of party defection than is approval.
(4) Among independents, disapproval appears to exercise a greater influence on voting choices.
Mutually complementary, these findings together offer strong support for the negative voting model which has been proposed here to explain marginal variations in midterm party fortunes. Negative voting provides an alternative to surge and decline for explaining the midterm electoral decline of the President's party. It is not a disproportionate withdrawal of independents from the electorate which explains the regular midterm shifts, for in fact independents maintain their contribution to the total midterm vote (see Table 1 ). Rather, in explaining midterm losses, one should know that independents who do remain in the electorate at the midterm disapprove of the President in greater numbers than those who drop out (Table 4) . Among the independents who vote, disapprovers appear more likely to base their congressional choices on their presidential evaluation than do approvers. And it is not important that the level of partisan defections declines (for it does not), but that the defections at the midterm occur disproportionately within the President's party (Table 7) , primarily among his detractors (Table 6 ). The electoral biases against the administration party erase that party's gains made two years earlier.
In addition, the negative voting thesis allows us to address important movements of public preferences across a series of midterm elections. Perhaps the sensitivity of negative voting to politically important, marginal shifts in the total vote is what most commends the negative voting model to our attention.
Unlike other sources of defection (such as friends-andneighbors voting) which tend to cancel out, defections based on negative voting accumulate systematically across congressional districts. In order to appreciate more fully the relationship between the President's popularity and variations in aggregated totals, we return now to where we began-namely, to variations in the congressional vote over time.
Aggregating Individual-Level Relationships
Moving from individual-level relationships to marginal variations in the national congressional vote presents several difficulties. One has to deal with the unequal contributions of presidential approval and disapproval on both turnout and defection. More confounding is the averaging of rates of turnout and defection, which vary in strength from year to year. Add to this the assumption that presidents become more or less popular among all partisan groups at roughly the same rate.41 Finally, include in the estimate the uneven distribution of party loyalties in the electorate, which because of the greater influence of negative evaluations means that the larger the President's party the greater the electoral costs of becoming less popular. Given these problems, any estimation of the aggregate effects of popularity must be taken as tentative. With these caveats in mind the calculations were made, however, and they indicate that for every nine-point change in the percentage approving of the President, his party's congressional vote will change 1.4 percentage points.42
Of course, an easier way of reaching the same results is to work directly from aggregate percentages such as those displayed in Figures 1  and 2 . Edward Tufte has performed a regression analysis of these data and concluded that "a change in presidential popularity of 10 percentage points in the Gallup Poll is associated with a national change of 1.3 percentage points in the national midterm vote for congressional candidates of the President's party."43 It is gratifying to find that by using negative voting, estimates based on survey research are independently confirmed by the actual congressional vote. Were Republican forebodings well-founded? The negative voting thesis would suggest that they were.
Richard
In Figure 4 Also, to the degree that legislative representatives are less well known to their constituency, there will be fewer "local" references competing with evaluations of the chief executive.50
By investigating the importance of approval and disapproval of the administration on voting choices for a variety of political settings, we should arrive at a better appreciation of the effects of structural features of political systems on short-term political change.
Appendix. Examination of Alternative Explanation of Turnout
There is some reason to suspect that general political involvement may produce both higher levels of disapproval of the President and greater voting turnout. Fred Greenstein has described the President as a "cognitive aid" for the less sophisticated public.51 One may speculate that the President should receive a more positive evaluation from those citizens who are dependent on him for understanding and evaluating the political environment.
On a similar theme Kernell, Sperlich, and Wildavsky have found that adherence to norms that the President should be supported comes disproportion- ately from the less politically aware and less participant segments of the population.52 Greater levels of education, psychological flexibility, and political sophistication are all associated with a tendency to disavow blanket support for the President. If we translate low support for norms into actual support for the incumbent President, we may find persons who are more likely to vote in low-stimulus elections are also as a group less generous with the President, whoever he might be.
In order to test this argument we first need to determine whether high levels of political sophistication and involvement are in fact related to a more critical posture toward the President. In examining this question, we must avoid a conceptual snag. If, as the negative voting model hypothesizes, disapproval activates electoral participation it should concomitantly foster political interest in the campaign and election outcome. Implicit in negative voting then is the claim that political interest-that is, interest about the upcoming election-may directly reflect disaffection with the incumbent administration. Short-run interest measured by such variables as campaign participation, perceived importance of elections, attention to the campaigns, and the desire to vote should, according to both the negative voting thesis and the alternative explanation, be associated with presidential approval. Most measures of political interest and involvement employed in election-year surveys focus on these short-run qualities and are therefore for our purposes less helpful in comparing the competing explanations.
What is needed to test for spuriousness are measures soliciting information about more general and durable forms of political involvement and sophistication.
Variables representing a continuing interest in politics and reflecting in large part the cognitive and expressive skills of the individual should be most relevant to a "critical" evaluation of a president's job performance. Operational measures of such variables are not nearly so abundant in public opinion surveys as those tapping transitory campaign interest. In fact, the conceptual variable which I shall call general political involvement is rarely distinguished from and generally combined with campaign interest to measure a more encompassing and poorly specified quality of political interest. Given this deficiency it is difficult to determine conclusively whether general political involvement leads to higher rates of disapproval. On those 
